This was the 26th in a series of monthly challenge matches on OKbridge. Billed as the “Goldway” series, it has been a popular feature since it began in July, 1997. In this edition, world champions Bobby Levin and Paul Soloway took on my son Rich Pavlicek and me in a 34-board* match. The match was hosted by Tony Reuss (alias Tuna) and watched live by hundreds of spectators. The deals were played earlier in the week by other OKbridge members to determine the comparison results. Scoring was by IMPs.
*Actually 36 but two were thrown out. Paul misclicked on one, allowing us to make a game that was routinely down; and on the other he did not see Bobby’s opening bid and passed with 8 points. In each case we did not get the “undos” started in time so the results were recorded; but since they had nothing to do with bridge, the only fair thing was to junk them.
Writing up these deals brought out some deep emotions, not from the match itself but in memory of Bobby Goldman. His untimely death last May left a void in my heart, as I’m sure it did for everyone else who knew him. I had the pleasure of being Goldman’s partner in a National many years ago and only wish that more could have rubbed off. He used his great knowledge of the game not to exhibit superiority but to help me, as he did many others. A true class act.
A rather peaceful start. Rich judged well to pass out Bobby’s 1 opening. Had he balanced with 2 , I have no doubt that Bobby and Paul would reach 5 , a sound game that makes with routine play.
Against 1 we started a forcing defense, shortening Bobby’s trumps. He tried to cash two clubs, and when Rich ruffed and continued diamonds, Bobby played to ensure his contract by using dummy’s entry to ruff another diamond. With spades 3-3 he secured an eighth trick. Note that if we did not force him to ruff, he could retain trump control and win nine tricks.
We were treading on thin ice here. Bobby’s weak jump overcall was hefty, although probably the right strategy with Paul a passed hand. I made a dubious negative double on skimpy values; Paul extended the preempt, and Rich pushed to 4 comforted by the known spade fit.
After the J held at Trick 3, I don’t care for Rich’s choice to cash both top trumps. This allowed Paul to win the A and lead the J to smother Rich’s nine and force the queen, and then later draw dummy’s last trump — down 4. If Rich cashed only one top trump and led a heart, he could get out for down one, a plus position since 4 is cold their way (and also 3 NT, though tough to reach). But this was only a small loss; no double, no trouble.
Bobby was aggressive here, jumping to 3 NT after a Stayman sequence. He hoped his long club suit would provide the punch, but luck was on our side with the club finesse losing.
Rich led a heart despite the 2 bid because of his good intermediate spots. Note the choice to lead low (fourth best) as opposed to the normal jack lead. This is often a winning strategy to avoid suit blockage when an opponent is known to hold four cards. Of course, it can sometimes backfire miserably (see Board 33).
At double-dummy I should win the A and shift to a diamond (down two) but this was far from obvious, so I played the Q to inhibit a holdup. I also had high hopes that the clubs would be dead (Paul’s doubleton) which was not to be. Paul could have escaped for down one by simply running the J, but he chose to lead low to the queen which held; then, not sure of the situation, he returned to his A to continue clubs — down two, since we now had the K to cash as well.
We got to a good 4 here that some pairs missed. Rich had an interesting decision after transferring to 2 . A simple 3 invitation looks rather normal, but he chose 2 NT since he had scattered values and a lousy six-card suit. Neither mattered, of course, since I had a clear acceptance for the game in spades. I suppose some Souths took a conservative view and passed 2 .
There was nothing to the play, just needing a normal 2-1 trump break.
Note how Rich handled his major two-suiter. Many players would use Michaels, but we play this shows either a weak hand or a hand too strong for an overcall. Hence, with an intermediate-range hand like this we begin with an overcall. Usually there will be more bidding, then Rich would bid his hearts. Oops, not this time. Paul was not going to reopen with length in spades and shortness in hearts.
Just as well. We stayed low on this misfit that caused trouble at some tables. After a heart lead, Rich ruffed a heart in dummy and then played trumps like he went to the pre-game Hand Record Party. Seriously, leading the Q was clearly the percentage play with Paul having opened and marked with spade length from his passout of 1 . This made nine tricks routine, and Rich had 10 when Bobby pitched a heart, not knowing that Rich started with five.
Rich chose to open a 14-point notrump (systemically this showed 15-17) based on his three tens, which was certainly reasonable, although a pedestrian 1 might have been wiser with 4-3-3-3 shape. But who can argue with success.
Rich was also double-dummy in the play. After the passive heart lead, Rich had eight sure tricks and needed either a diamond trick or his long club to secure nine. He correctly started diamonds (I like his lead of the 10) and Bobby made a good play in ducking. I must admit I would put up the king because, if the diamond lost to the queen or jack, the obvious spade switch would give me no more time to mess with diamonds. But Rich let it ride, losing to the ace. Lucky! Bobby later was squeezed in the minors for an overtrick.
After my light third-seat opening, Paul and Bobby bid well to reach the normal game contract. Bobby’s 2 cue-bid strikes me as a tad weak — I would just raise to 3 , but Paul would bid again (probably 3 ) and the same 3 NT would be reached.
The play was interesting. When my K held, I could not be sure of the exact layout (we play attitude on a king lead, so Rich could have held a doubleton). It was also obvious I could not beat the contract with the diamond suit alone. So I switched to a spade. This simplified the play for Bobby, as he could now develop a second spade to ensure nine tricks. Had I continued diamonds to drive out the ace, Bobby would lack the entries to work on spades, so he’d be forced to play on hearts. The heart finesse loses, of course, but he would still survive when my jack drops doubleton. Nonetheless, some players must have botched this considering our 6 IMP loss.
Bobby and Paul conducted a fine auction to stop in game, avoiding the temptation to bid a poor slam. Bobby showed keen judgment; after making several slam tries, he respected Paul’s decision. I know there are many players out there with a devil-may-care attitude who would just take a shot a 6 , but this exhibits little partnership trust. Ideally, one would prefer to play 3 NT instead of 5 , but Bobby could not realistically give up so soon.
There was nothing to the play. Exactly 11 tricks were available since there was no way to avoid a club loser.
After Paul opened 1 NT, Bobby chose the practical way to bid his slam-going hand. While it is possible the partnership could be lacking control in hearts or clubs, an attempt to be overly scientific might direct the killing lead. Four hearts was a Texas transfer, then 4 NT was Roman key-card Blackwood. Holding four of the five key cards, the slam was routinely bid.
Paul’s decision to finesse spades here is interesting. If the J were a singleton and he lost to a stiff K, he would be defeated; so it seems right to guarantee the contract by winning the A. But this is a moot point. Taking the normal percentage play in spades might win a single IMP many times, while costing the contract only very rarely; so it may be the right play after all — I’m not going to attempt a mathematical analysis. Ironically, playing safe would have netted the overtrick as the cards lie.
My 2 bid was a relay game try (an artificial asking bid) and Rich’s 3 showed a minimum with no concentration of secondary values. So, my game ambitions went down the drain, and we sold out when Bobby competed to 3 , an accurate decision since 3 would make.
Paul could have made 3 if he guessed the doubleton Q, but this is easier to do when looking at all four hands. There was no way to take the successful spade finesse, so he gave up a spade trick to create an entry to dummy. Curiously, our defense of establishing the Q worked to our advantage (not that we knew this, of course) as the contract hinged only on the club finesse. If Paul had to contend with his fourth club as well, he might have just cashed the A-K, rather than remove dummy’s ruffing power and risk going down two.
Bobby and Paul stopped just in time. I’m not sure why Paul chose to respond 1 NT (forcing) instead of 1 — perhaps they were playing Flannery (I don’t know, it never came up) so that Bobby could not have a minimum opening with 4-5 in the majors. In any event, his next raise to 3 was a bit pushy considering the dubious Q and being nonvulnerable (I would pass).
I found the best lead of a spade, then later I switched to diamonds to attack dummy’s entry. (Note the lead of the J to cater to declarer having A-8-x). Lacking entries to dummy, Bobby was unable to take the normal percentage play in clubs (two finesses), but he guessed it right anyway, playing me for the jack.
Another slam; well, almost. Bobby chose to make a limit raise with his shapely hand, and Paul bid 3 NT (forcing) as a “trump cue-bid” and slam try. I don’t use this method, but note how it conserves room for partner to cue-bid clubs if he held the ace. Bobby discouraged with his poor trumps, and Paul ended the auction in slam as he intended all along. (The purpose of 3 NT was to explore a possible grand slam).
Hooray for Rich! He found the killing lead — a heart — after which Paul had no chance, losing a club and a heart. With a different lead, Paul could succeed on a crossruff.
Paul chose to open 2 NT with his exceptional 19-count, the practical decision despite the weakness in spades. This led to the routine game after a Stayman sequence.
Rich found the best lead of a heart, and Paul had seven sure tricks assuming the clubs ran. Note his keen decision to play a diamond at Trick 2 rather than a spade. Either suit might provide two extra tricks, but the difference is that if the Q lost to the ace, there is still a chance for a second diamond trick; not so in spades if the Q lost to the ace. When the Q held, he could now secure his game by establishing a spade trick. Note what would have happened with the careless play of a spade at Trick 2.
Bobby got to play a peaceful 2 after his light one-bid — a Roth weak two-bid — since the vulnerability forced us to be cautious. No big deal, since 2 by us would be defeated (East gets a trump promotion with continued diamond leads). The cards lay favorably for them, and even a gross overbid of 3 NT would have made.
There was little to the play as Bobby took his nine obvious tricks, aided by the diamond finesse.
We got lucky on this one. After Bobby opened 1 NT, it seemed right to take advantage of the favorable vulnerability so I jumped to 3 to put pressure on the opponents. Alas, it was Rich with all the goods, and he wasn’t in on the joke, so he raised to game.
After the favorable heart lead, I considered finessing the jack immediately, which might have been the only legitimate play to make 4 . But it seemed so unlikely that Paul would have the Q, so I resigned myself to being down one, not two. I won the top hearts, pitching a diamond. The fall of the Q really didn’t help as I couldn’t get another discard with trumps out. But something strange happened. I ruffed a heart and led a club, preparing for a club ruff in dummy, and Bobby switched to ace and another spade. Now I was home, thanks to the ruffing diamond finesse.
After Rich opened 1 , Bobby overcalled 1 NT (15-18) and Paul took a chance on game with his long club suit. (This was a bad day for running club suits.)
I led my partner’s suit, and Bobby had seven sure tricks. It was clearly futile to work on clubs. His only real hope was to develop two heart tricks, which would require some luck or misdefense. Note his clever play of crossing to the A and leading a low heart; this might have worked on some layouts, but Rich accurately played low. Bobby won the jack and continued hearts. Rich won and switched to clubs, knowing I was marked with the queen from Bobby’s line of play. On the run of the spades, Rich discarded well, and there was no way Bobby could succeed.
Bobby’s ultralight third-seat opening stole the deal, which belongs to us, though I must admit I would have passed it out in fourth seat. Paul responded 1 NT and easily bought it there, as neither Rich or I even considered any action.
Rich chose a passive spade lead, and Paul had five sure tricks. We could have held him to that: When Rich won the K at Trick 5, he probably should shift to a low club, after which we could cash out for down two. The heart layout was ambiguous to Rich but could be deduced from the logic of the play. Nonetheless, Rich continued the passive spade attack and Paul now had six tricks, down one.
Rich’s 1 opening was on the light side, but it was more appropriate than a weak two-bid at favorable vulnerability. This almost allowed us to buy the contract at 3 , but Bobby gave due respect to Paul’s takeout double at adverse vulnerability and competed to 3 . Naturally, I pushed on to 4 with my eight-bagger.
This contract was routinely down one when I wasn’t inspired to take the first-round club finesse. The bidding made a stiff club with East rather likely, but it might have been the queen, so my straightforward play seemed right. (If it were possible to cash one top club first, then the finesse would be superior I think.) I would have expected a slight plus position here, since 3 is cold (actually 4 can be made with the correct diamond play, but this is double-dummy), but we drew a small minus instead.
This was a funny one. After Bobby routinely opened 1 , Paul chose to respond 1 (passing seems right to me). This eclipsed Rich’s long suit, so he decided to overcall on his four-card spade suit. Bobby had a great playing hand and jump-shifted to 3 , then Paul was endplayed into bidding 3 NT with his spade stopper. Paul’s aggressive bidding might have worked on a different layout, but not this time.
Rich led his real suit, and the sight of the first two tricks was like Christmas morning to young child. After winning the K-J, I shifted to a spade (brilliant, huh?) and Rich cashed out for down four. This is the kind of score (3 NT, 400) that you have look at twice to realize it’s not an ordinary result.
Rich’s vulnerable overcall leaves something to be desired — besides tying the world’s record for the worst six-card suit — but I guess he deserves some credit for not opening 2 . Notwithstanding, the hand does belong to our side (3 is cold) despite being outnumbered in HCP 23 to 17. Neither of us could realistically bid 3 , of course, so we sold out to 3 . Paul’s double of 2 was competitive (not penalty) saying, “I’m not sure what to bid, but do something.”
Paul was doomed in 3 on the foul layout and did the best he could to salvage down two. Rich led his singleton, and Paul immediately attacked trumps, playing ace and another when Rich split his honors. This left the diamond suit blocked, so we could never collect our three spade tricks. Had Rich played low on the first diamond, Paul probably would play the same; then a spade shift (queen or 10) would allow us to set him three.
This was a miserable hand for E-W, and Levin-Soloway did far better than most. Note how they avoided playing in notrump, where they’d probably win only four tricks after a heart lead.
Once again, “club notrumps” were fatal tonight. Paul chose to upgrade his 18-point hand to a 2 NT opening, based on the potential of his club suit. Then a routine Stayman sequence led to 3 NT. Oops. Strike that potential, as Bobby puts down a club void and Paul must contend with a hopeless task.
Rich found a great lead with the J, ducked to the king, then Paul established dummy’s fourth heart. My discard of a club on the third heart warned Rich against that shift, so he continued spades and we cashed our spade tricks. In the end we were destined to get two more tricks.
Now it was our turn for a slam. My 4 NT after the Jacoby transfer was quantitative (not Blackwood) to invite slam in hearts or notrump. Rich was “in the middle” but his good spot cards made it clear-cut to accept.
Bobby led the J and Rich won in dummy to take the club finesse. He then took the diamond finesse and repeated the club finesse, and with everything friendly wound up with 13 tricks. I’m not sure I like the diamond finesse at Trick 3 because the club finesse might not be working (Bobby would usually duck the first time). I would play the K and a heart to dummy, then repeat the club finesse; if it lost I might face the same predicament after a diamond shift, but this may not happen, and at least I wouldn’t have created it myself. But nothing mattered here.
Rich’s jump to 3 was inverted (weak), a dubious action with only J-x-x-x in trumps but reasonable with a singleton heart. These auctions are often competitive, and a direct barrage usually creates an advantage. I gave a fleeting thought to 3 NT, but this might be a disaster if Paul led a club; and further, my wealth of controls and lack of secondary values strongly suggested suit play. Could there be a slam? I didn’t think so — I’ve seen enough of Rich’s weak bids — so I just bid 5 . Note that 3 NT would fail even though Rich held a club stopper.
My basic plan in 5 was to pitch one of dummy’s spades on my top hearts, then ruff a heart and one or two spades in dummy. The play went as expected, and when spades split 3-3 my position was cozy and I could consider the danger of a bad trump break. At Trick 9 I could also have succeeded by playing a diamond to the nine (a safety play), but my club ruff was just as safe and would not cost an overtrick, e.g., if Paul held a blank Q. (Also note that if Paul had a doubleton club and overruffed, the rest of my diamonds must fall based on the hand count.) When Paul showed out on the first diamond, the ending was a lock.
Bobby’s 1 NT response was forcing — again with four spades (compare Board 36-12) so they must have been playing Flannery — and Paul solved his awkward rebid problem with a raise to 2 NT (I agree completely). Bobby had more than enough to accept.
I led my fourth-best club, and Bobby won the king. Despite the abundance of high cards, Bobby had no sure road to nine tricks (note that if Rich had the A the contract would be set). Bobby could have (maybe should have) won 11 tricks by just leading and continuing hearts, but when the J held he chose to take out a little insurance in case Rich erred in ducking the heart. He unblocked the diamonds and cashed his spades (which might have split to ensure the contract), then exited with a heart and of course I was endplayed.
Rich showed fine discipline here. With his powerful two-suiter it is tempting to gamble on a slam (6 or 6 ) after Paul’s club bid — I might have spade control, or they might not lead a spade and he could get rid of one. But he chose the scientific route and honored my decision to sign off (for a change, ha-ha). So we stopped comfortably in 4 . Alas, some pairs bid the poor slam and made it, so our score was barely average.
Bobby’s diamond lead seems strange — at the table I thought surely it was a singleton — but only a spade lead would make a difference. Rich just drew trumps and had adequate diamond entries to establish a club for a spade discard.
Bobby and Paul bid accurately to the best game, carefully avoiding 3 NT which probably depends on the club finesse after a diamond lead. Bobby’s third-round 3 bid seems questionable to me with Q-x in both unbid suits, but considering the contract improvement it is enlightening. In this case, however, either game makes.
There was little to the play, as Bobby could laugh at my singleton club lead. He quickly drew trumps and claimed 11 tricks. (With just an overtrick involved, he assumed I had at least one of the aces so he could get to dummy to repeat the club finesse. If this were not the case, we would reject and Bobby would reclaim 10 tricks. This kind of settlement is common at IMPs to save time.)
We stopped wisely here in 3 — note that 3 NT is hopeless with no entry to Rich’s hand. Rich’s 1 NT response was forcing (in our system it could be as much as 14 HCP) and I barely had enough to bid 2 NT, though some would disagree. Rich then bid his diamond suit, and I was happy to pass with my meager collection.
The operation was successful, but the patient died. Bobby found the killing K lead, which was especially brutal when Rich ducked assuming he held K-Q. When the smoke cleared we were down two. Even if Rich won the first club, the best he could achieve is down one — even at double-dummy — so credit Bobby with the win. Even more frustrating was seeing that some North-South pairs bid and made 3 NT.
A routine auction allowed me to play 1 NT. (Note that 1 NT forcing does not apply in competition.) I actually considered jumping to 2 NT (limit, NF) but wisely took the conservative view.
Making seven tricks was easy, as the 9 lead gave me three natural spade tricks by covering and finessing. I led the 10 immediately, covered by all, and won the routine spade return. I didn’t dare lead another heart for fear Paul would win and lead a diamond, after which I could be set if I guessed wrong. So, I cashed out. I actually won only seven tricks, but Bobby insisted I claim eight because of what happened at Trick 9: I led a low diamond, Paul took a long time before playing low, then I put up the king. Paul, of course, was not coffeehousing but his connection was lagging. Bobby, always a gentleman, knew I would otherwise have guessed it from the bidding.
Bobby’s double of 1 NT showed a one-suited hand. We play “system on” over a double, so I transferred to spades then bid 3 NT to offer a choice of games. Rich had no problem choosing spades with his four-card fit and worthless hearts.
They don’t come much flatter than this — a laydown 10 tricks.
We started the bidding, but Paul ended it with his 1 NT overcall. It is interesting that Bobby chose not to transfer to spades (I would). Indeed, 2 by East is the best contract and cannot be defeated, while 1 NT can be set with the normal club lead.
Alas. Rich chose to be passive here and led a spade (this is reasonable at matchpoints but seems wrong at IMPs) and Paul won the A-Q. Surprisingly, Paul next led a diamond which allows us to get back on track — Rich could win and lead a club, or duck and let me win and shift to clubs. Alas again. Rich won and continued diamonds, so Paul had his contract and actually made nine tricks in the end. Note that if Paul led the K early (instead of a diamond) there is no defense to stop 1 NT.
Bobby and Paul reached the normal game with their 26 HCP. In their methods Paul could not respond 2 NT (that would be a heart raise) so he was obliged to bid his mangy club suit first and then 3 NT after Bobby’s raise.
Where there are eight top tricks a ninth can usually be found, but not this time. Rich found the best lead of a diamond; Paul won the ace and pursued his best chance of finding the J onside. Note that this is better than hoping for a 3-3 heart break; and further, even if hearts were 3-3, the opponents may be able to set you with a spade switch when the J is wrong. Nothing much mattered here. Rich toyed with him for a while with a heart shift, ducked, but Paul had no way to succeed.
Rich stepped off base here I think. After the Michaels cue-bid and 2 takeout, I doubled to show a strong opening in hopes we could compete. When Paul raised to 3 , Rich felt he should do something holding an ace, so he bid 4 . Ouch. Bobby took a piece of that, and there I was. Rich does have a legitimate problem, but I feel a pass is correct at IMPs (I would double at matchpoints). Raising to 4 on this auction with three small trumps just begs for trouble.
After winning the A, I immediately took the losing diamond finesse and won the club shift (an obvious singleton). I thought I was up against a 5-0 trump break, so I continued diamonds. Argh! Paul gets a ruff with his stiff trump, though in retrospect there was nothing I could do to improve the end result (leading trumps from my hand is no good). The rest was an open book, and down three was the best I could do. Oh well. Next time I’ll make Rich play these hands.
Bobby and Paul got to the normal 3 NT — not a great contract, but hard to stay out of with 25 HCP and two five-card suits. Bobby’s 2 was an artificial game force (two-way checkback), Paul showed his club length, and Bobby signed off in game.
Rich was not inspired here — more like perspired — as he found the lovely lead of a low club. As bad as it looks this time, it’s not unreasonable; if he caught me with the ace, king or nine it would be a great start. But here it gave Paul an easy nine tricks, and he wound up with 10 when Rich later got endplayed.
Curiously, declarer can always succeed as the cards lie. After, say, the K lead, declarer wins and plays spades twice, which leaves the defense cramped. If South clears the hearts, declarer has nine tricks (with a correct diamond guess); and if South defends passively, declarer can develop the spades since the heart blockage prevents the defense from running the suit.
After two routine bids, Bobby chose to rebid 1 NT with his awkward hand. This led quickly to the normal game and was lucky for us. If Bobby instead had rebid 2 , Paul would bid 3 NT and have an easier time with Rich on lead.
This seems like a friendly deal with both minor aces onside and clubs 3-3, but “friendly” is in the eyes of the beholder. On the 6 lead (fourth best) Bobby knew Rich had one card higher, and he properly ducked to ensure two diamond stoppers (note that playing the king or queen would be disastrous if Rich held the ace). Rich won the jack and shifted to heart, attacking declarer’s communication. Bobby elected to win this in dummy and take a straight club finesse for his contract. Ouch. An alternative would be to win the heart shift in hand and lead the 10 (ducked), then the J, etc., but this offers no assurance of nine tricks either. Bobby’s play was sound, just unlucky.
© 1999 Richard Pavlicek
by Richard Pavlicek by Richard Pavlicek