Circa 1943, my Uncle Cedric was assigned to the Manhattan Project. Despite being a renowned physicist, he was no help to the project because of his obsession with bridge. Instead of advancing nuclear fission, Cedric used their small hadron collider to accelerate playing cards, trying to prove that a winning finesse actually loses, and a losing finesse actually wins.
Was he successful? Well, yes and no. Cedric’s triumphant discovery of The Un-Finesse was soon proclaimed a deal of infamy, after which he was shunned by both bridge players and physicists. Besieged by disrespect, Cedric spent his remaining years creating useless bridge puzzles. (Fortunately none of his exploits rubbed off on me.)
Major bridge events also include some deals of infamy, most of which were widely publicized, fueling their notoriety. Six of these deals are presented for this puzzle. Your task is to identify the contract — they were all doubled — and the declarer, direction and name.
All you have to do is select buttons. If you don’t have a clue, just guess!
Contract? 4 × 5 × 5 × 6 ×
Declarer? West North East South
Lorenzo Lauria Sidney Lazard Agustin Madala Ron Schwartz
Contract? 3 × 3 × 3 × 3 NT×
John Crawford Fulvio Fantoni Terence Reese Alan Sontag
Contract? 6 × 6 NT× 7 × 7 ×
Barry Crane Oswald Jacoby Ron Klinger Adam Zmudzinski
Quit
Contract? 5 × 5 × 6 × 7 ×
Cezary Balicki Georg Nippgen Henri Szwarc Bobby Wolff
Contract? 6 × 6 × 7 × 7 ×
Gabriel Chagas Geir Helgemo Zia Mahmood Christian Mari
Jeff Meckstroth Claudio Nunes Michel Perron Alexander Smirnov
For each problem, I awarded 4 points for the right contract and 3 points each for the right declarer direction and name, or 10 points total if all three were correct. The average score of all entries (23.59) was the lowest of all time. Despite two perfect 60s, the rest were not even close; next best was 27, five entries were below the expectation of random guesses (15) and one person scored 3. My usual practice is to list everyone above average, but that would be unkind with such disparity. Therefore, the bronze medal goes to my cat!
Going into this final board, Italy led by 11 IMPs but had a poor result (4 W -4) at the other table. When Soloway smartly doubled Lauria’s 5 overbid, the Americans had a chance to win.
Alas, the defense went afoul at Trick 7 when Soloway led a spade, allowing Lauria to pitch his losing heart on dummy’s stranded Q and escape for down one. The match would then have ended in a tie, which would be resolved by an 8-board playoff.
Oops! Lauria inadvertently called for the 7 from dummy but immediately asked to change it. The Director was called and ruled it could not be changed* (upheld when Italy later appeal) so Lauria was down two, giving the Americans the championship by 1 IMP!
*Correct ruling because Lauria’s error was not a mistaken designation but a change of mind. Evidently he had presumed a heart was led and was discarding a spade on that trick. Too bad he didn’t discard a club, as the change would then be allowed since he can’t be forced to revoke.
Lauria’s partner Versace was also to blame. When he became dummy on the final deal, instead of turning the cards as usual, he left the table, stranding his partner. Poor Lauria had to play in an unfamiliar environment, which may have led to his loss of concentration.
Jim Munday: 2003 Bermuda Bowl: “Small spade, please.”
This was the penultimate board of the match, and Meltzer enjoyed a 12-IMP lead. Commentators and knowledgeable observers all expected their easy win, because the last two boards seemed to have nothing in the cards to produce a significant swing. Then lightning struck!
Sontag eschewed a Precision 1 opening to describe his hand more conveniently. When East balanced with 1 NT, he jumped in hearts to show a super-max with at least 5-5. I think Berkowitz should have passed (his hearts were indeed ‘better’) but he gave a preference. When this came back to Moss, he knew the opposing contract was shaky, and out came the red card. The stakes had risen!
The defense got off to a bad start with a diamond lead, and East made a grave error at Trick 5 with a club return. Sontag now could make his contract: A, heart ruff, club ruff, A, then lead good hearts to endplay West in diamonds. Perhaps weary from the long event, Sontag failed to take advantage and suffered the ultimate loss, not even scoring his A.
Minus 800 cost 14 IMPs when 2 was made at the other table. The Diamond team was now in the lead by 2 IMPs! The last deal proved to be meaningless, though they managed to eke out an IMP to win by 3.
Jim Munday: 2010 Spingold. This deal is in Hard Knocks in the Big Easy.
This deal was the piece de resistance that caused Oswald Jacoby to quit in the middle of the famous Culbertson-Lenz match. Jacoby was well-known for his light openings or psychics, which is why Lenz bid a swift 3 NT rather than pursue a dubious slam. This was rubber bridge so Lenz was also eager to bank his 150 honors. Jacoby’s hand was ill-suited for notrump, so the duel began — hearts, notrump (4N was not Blackwood), hearts, notrump — the last being a leap to slam, depriving the irate Jacoby from an easy make in 6 .
When 6 NT was passed around, Culbertson made a wily double, no doubt on general principles after listening to the dueling banjos. Ouch! Six notrump was destined to make (Lightner would never lead a club) but Jacoby ran again to 7 , where Culbertson now had him nailed. Or maybe not… If Jacoby had run once more to seven spades, the next day’s headlines might read: Culbertson Eats Crow!
Jim Munday: Culbertson-Lenz match. Ozzie didn’t have the “not sure when the bidding will get back to me” excuse on this one.
In my view this scenario is the most reprehensible of all time. As scored, Nippgen was down five in 5 ×, a good result with North-South cold for 6 (bid at the other table) for a gain of 8 IMPs. Germany ended up winning the close match by 3 IMPs (154-151).
But wait! Nippgen clearly lost eight tricks: one spade, three hearts (with the ruff), two diamonds and two trumps, which is down six, so the correct score was minus 1400. Compared to 1430 in the other room, this gains only 1 IMP, which would make Canada the winner by 4 IMPs (151-147). A done deal, right? Canada wins.
Wrong! When Canada noticed the error, it was after the so-called “correction period,” which by common sense should not apply to blatant scoring errors. Nonetheless, a special committee ruled that since both sides agreed to down five at the table, the phony score would stand! Germany then went on to win the final to become world champions. Of what? A world that can’t keep score? Bridge at its finest.
Jim Munday: 1990 Rosenblum. Do we know who was on the committee?
I believe their names were redacted from all records, because in Canada they were wanted fugitives.
This board decided the 1980 world championship. After a highly competitive auction, Chemla did not want to defend 6 for a small profit and pushed to 7 , a tactical move that might depend on the opening lead. And did it ever! Hamman was well aware that Chemla could be bluffing with a spade loser, but odds were overwhelming that he was void in spades not hearts. After much consternation Hamman led the heart ace, and Mari soon claimed his grand. The result at the other table was 6 × down 1, so France won 19 IMPs.
If Hamman had led a spade, the Americans would have won 9 IMPs instead of losing 19 — a swing of 28 IMPs! The Americans would then have won the match by 8 IMPs instead of losing by 20. After seeing dummy’s void on his heart lead, Hamman called for a waiter, “I’d like to order a sharp razor blade.”
Jim Munday: 1980 Olympiad: “…and a razor blade.”
For most players, bridge is a game of accurate bidding and skillful card play. For others it’s a crapshoot, as demonstrated by West on this controversial deal. The Pakistani N-S conducted a fine auction to reach the only successful grand slam — note the need to establish clubs with a ruff — yet their achievement was stolen when Meckstroth rolled the dice to bid seven spades.
The egregious sacrifice should have been down 10, but the defense dropped a trick, or maybe it was just Mecksroth’s card play being so much better than his bidding. At the other table the Americans also bid 7 and were able to play there when the Pakistani West was less inspired, or as I see it, not afflicted with temporary insanity.
This deal was a key factor in bringing about the 1987 scoring change to increase penalties for nonvulnerable doubled sets of four or more. I suppose you could say this returned our game from the crap table to the bridge table.
Jim Munday: 1981 Bermuda Bowl. N-S should have defended better.
Uncle Cedric has been gone over 40 years, but I still recall his poetic philosophy: “Spare me the comforts of a better place, and financial burdens I could never face. Just give me a quark to convert to an ace, as I ready my capsule for outer space.” I’m guessing he’s on Saturn by now, as he envisioned its rings to be a great hadron collider.
Meanwhile, an Earthling (by most accounts) supplies these parting words:
Jim Munday: Finally I can show Sue that my time on rpbridge.net is well spent by getting all these answers and winning the grand prize of… oops, never mind.
Sue may appreciate your perfect score, but as I see it, you ranked only one place ahead of my cat.
© 2025 Richard Pavlicek
by Richard Pavlicek by Richard Pavlicek